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Abstract 
This article has 2 goals: to provide additional evidence that exposure to ideological online news 
media contributes to political misperceptions, and to test 3 forms this media-effect might take. 
Analyses are based on representative survey data collected during the 2012 U.S. presidential 
election (N = 1,004). Panel data offer persuasive evidence that biased news site use promotes 
inaccurate beliefs, while cross-sectional data provide insight into the nature of these effects. 
There is no evidence that exposure to ideological media reduces awareness of politically 
unfavorable evidence, though in some circumstances biased media do promote 
misunderstandings of it. The strongest and most consistent influence of ideological media 
exposure is to encourage inaccurate beliefs regardless of what consumers know of the evidence.  
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Driving a Wedge Between Evidence and Beliefs: How Online Ideological News Exposure 
Promotes Political Misperceptions 
The emergence of the Internet as a primary source of political information has transformed many 
Americans’ experience of the news, giving voice to previously marginalized political factions 
and creating outlets for explicitly ideological reporting (Stroud, 2011; C. Sunstein, 2001). This 
transformation has been accompanied by numerous high-profile misperceptions, such as 
erroneous beliefs about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and about the birthplace of President 
Obama (World Public Opinion, 2006; YouGov Staff, 2014). The possibility that these 
phenomena are related is troubling, but evidence for the relationship is limited and the processes 
by which it might occur are not well understood. This article further substantiates the idea that 
ideologically slanted online news use promotes misperceptions. It also offers a theoretical 
argument, and preliminary evidence, suggesting that this does not occur because partisan outlets 
shield news consumers from more accurate (but less politically favorable) information; instead, a 
key way in which exposure to biased news shapes people’s beliefs is unrelated to their 
knowledge about relevant evidence. This has important implications for the accuracy of political 
knowledge in the online news environment. 
Misperceptions pose a fundamental challenge to democracy. A democratic state cannot 
ensure well-informed decision making when citizens are unable to agree about the political 
realities to which they must respond (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). This problem is especially 
pressing today, as disputes over the facts are often most acute across party lines, resulting in 
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partisan belief gaps (Hindman, 2009). There are some indications that the accuracy of 
Americans’ beliefs about the political world vary by their use of partisan news media (Meirick, 
2013; PublicMind Poll, 2012), though evidence of a causal relationship is modest (but, see 
Feldman, Myers, Hmielowski, & Leiserowitz, 2014). The specific effects of exposure to online 
ideological outlets on misperceptions merit more careful scrutiny.  
Contemporary explanations for the Internet’s role in promoting misperceptions tend to 
fall into two camps. Some scholars suggest that online news facilitates politically biased news 
consumption, leaving partisan audiences with knowledge deficits that promote inaccurate beliefs 
(e.g., C. R. Sunstein, 2009). On this view, misperceptions reflect individual-level information 
deficits stemming from insular online news habits. This explanation implies that factual disputes 
might vanish if citizens were only more aware of evidence for their political opponents’ beliefs. 
Such predictions are grounded in inaccurate assumptions about how individuals use the 
Internet to get information. The presumption is that given the vast range of viewpoints available, 
online news users will almost invariably be insulated from perspectives that differ from their 
own, either by virtue of their decision to avoid sources that present other viewpoints (C. 
Sunstein, 2001) or the automatic exclusion of attitude discrepant sources by search engines and 
recommender systems (Pariser, 2011). Empirical evidence, however, shows that most online 
consumption is far more diverse than these arguments would predict. For instance, U.S. Internet 
use scores a 7.5 on a 101-point isolation index, where 100 corresponds to perfect segregation and 
0 means no segregation (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011). Nor has social media-based filtering 
eliminated diversity: Between 20% and 30% of the news stories that Facebook users select come 
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from sources that do not share their political ideology (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015). 
Other scholars argue that misperceptions are the result of the psychological processes 
through which information is interpreted, and perceptions formed. This perspective is more 
compatible with what we know about contemporary online news practices, as it does not 
presume that individuals must be insulated from other viewpoints in order to hold 
misperceptions. This explanation is sometimes offered as a complement to knowledge deficit-
based explanations (e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, 2010, p. 307), while at other times it is offered as an 
alternative (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011, p. 166). We argue that exposure to 
ideological news websites promote misperceptions by altering both what users know about 
relevant evidence and whether their personal beliefs are consistent with that knowledge. We are, 
however, skeptical of the claim that biased news use will leave citizens unaware of the evidence.  
Empirically, this study uses a unique set of survey data collected during the 2012 U.S. 
presidential election to test a series of relationships between exposure to ideological online news 
media and political misperceptions. Three-wave panel data provide compelling evidence that 
ideological media do stimulate misperceptions among their audience, while cross-sectional 
analyses suggest that use of ideologically oriented website is increasing belief in outlet-favored 
misperceptions even after accounting for the accuracy of individuals’ knowledge of the evidence. 
Biased online media’s ability to undermine the beneficial effect of evidentiary knowledge may 
help to explain the prevalence of misperceptions today, and it raises important questions about 
the prospect of a more accurately informed electorate. The next section provides the theoretical 
background for these claims, setting the stage for the empirical work that follows. 
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Promoting misperceptions online 
We begin with a few definitions. For our purposes, political misperceptions are beliefs about 
politics that are inconsistent with the best available evidence (Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder, 
& Rich, 2000). This definition allows us to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate claims in 
the face of incomplete evidence. Claims that are compatible with publicly held information, such 
as relevant evidence and conclusions of experts, are considered correct; all other claims are 
incorrect.1 Importantly, this conceptualization allows us to discriminate between whether an 
individual has an accurate understanding of evidence relevant to a contentious claim and whether 
the individual’s beliefs about that claim are accurate. We will return to this distinction shortly. 
Ideologically oriented news sites are those that offer coverage consistently favoring one 
political perspective over others. The most obvious examples include websites that explicitly 
embrace their political leaning. For example, the Cybercast News Service’s 
(http://www.cnsnews.com/) tagline promises to deliver “The Right news. Right now.” while the 
DailyKos (http://www.dailykos.com/) proclaims itself to be a “Democratic blog, a partisan blog.” 
Often the political leaning of a news outlet is more subtle. Bias can be evident in the topics 
covered, as when an outlet provides disproportionate coverage of news unfavorable to an 
opposed party (Baum & Groeling, 2008); or it can show up in the sources of information that 
journalists rely on, more often turning to individuals affiliated with one ideology than another 
(Groseclose & Milyo, 2005).2 As should be clear from these examples, news sites that fall under 
the biased-outlet umbrella do not form a monolithic whole; the extent of bias and how it is 
expressed varies greatly. Nevertheless, there is value in examining whether use of this high-
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profile type of online news is contributing to the current political environment.  
The focus here is not on consumers’ exclusive reliance on outlets that affirm their 
beliefs—as so often presumed in discussions of online echo chambers (C. Sunstein, 2001) or 
filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011)—because most Americans use a wide range of online outlets 
(Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011). Instead, the emphasis is on the influence of exposure to biased 
outlets, regardless of what other information sources are consumed. Many online news users do 
use sources biased in favor of their ideological predispositions, even if they do not avoid other 
perspectives (Garrett, Carnahan, & Lynch, 2013). Thanks in large part to the ease with which 
individuals can create online content (Bruns, 2008), one can find support for almost any belief on 
the web, from antivaccination activism to 9/11 conspiracy theories (Silverman, 2015). Although 
inaccurate information may be most visible on low-credibility websites, in some instances well 
established news organizations have promoted misperceptions through their coverage (e.g., 
Feldman, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2012).  
The first question is whether the mere presence of more politically skewed online outlets 
in a consumer’s news diet can help to explain people’s misperceptions about the political world. 
Extant literature suggests that the answer is yes. Scholars argue that biased news media may 
promote outlet-favored misperceptions, misperceptions that benefit an outlet-allied party, 
candidate, or issue or that harm the opposition (e.g., Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; C. R. Sunstein, 
2009), and there is growing evidence that exposure to these distortions shapes consumers’ beliefs 
(Feldman, et al., 2014; Hindman, 2009; Meirick, 2013). Thus we begin by proposing two 
confirmatory hypotheses: use of ideologically oriented websites will increase outlet-favored 
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misperceptions (H1a) and reduce outlet-opposed misperceptions (H1b). 
The central question here, though, is how consuming news from these outlets influences 
beliefs. To answer this question, we return to the distinction between beliefs about an issue and 
knowledge of the evidence related to that issue. An example helps to illustrate the difference. 
Consider Americans’ acceptance of the heliocentric model. Perhaps surprisingly, only three in 
four (74.6%) Americans believe that the Earth orbits the sun.3 The rest, by our definition, hold a 
misperception. Most of these individuals are simply unaware of the evidence: More than one in 
three (36.8%) say they are not sure where science stands on the issue. Many more who endorse 
this inaccurate belief misunderstand the evidence: About a quarter (25.1%) believe that scientists 
think the sun revolves around the earth, and another one in eight (12.1%) say that scientists’ 
views are evenly divided. Factual misperceptions, however, can persist among those who hold 
information consistent with a more accurate conclusion. In this case, fully a quarter (25.9%) of 
those endorsing an incorrect view (that the sun revolves around the earth) correctly identified 
scientists’ conclusions (that the earth revolves around the sun). Our point is simple: 
Misperceptions are not due solely to ignorance or misunderstandings of the evidence; individuals 
sometimes hold beliefs that contradict their own knowledge of the evidence. 
With this distinction in mind, we next consider three different ways that using ideological 
online news outlets could contribute to misperceptions: (1) by reducing awareness of relevant 
evidence, by (2) misrepresenting that evidence, and (3) by encouraging users to adopt outlet-
favored views regardless of the evidence. We examine the theoretical bases for each of these 
possible outcomes in more detail before turning to the empirical tests.  
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Lack of familiarity with evidence 
Scholars have speculated that reliance on ideological news might leave individuals less aware of 
unpalatable evidence (e.g., Hindman, 2009; C. R. Sunstein, 2009). This has not been tested, and 
it is in our view unconvincing. Use of ideological news sites is unlikely to promote ignorance 
about political issues. Despite indications that news outlets’ topic coverage varies by their 
political orientation (Baum & Groeling, 2008), lies of omission are unlikely in a competitive 
news environment. The risk of detection, and the reputation cost this would entail for the outlet, 
are both high (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006). Even if an individual’s use of a biased source 
yielded little knowledge of evidence related to outlet-favored misperceptions, use of other, less 
biased outlets would likely fill in the gaps. Given the contradictory views on this subject, though, 
we propose a research question: Does use of ideologically oriented websites reduce familiarity 
with evidence about outlet-favored misperceptions (RQ1)?  
Misunderstanding the evidence 
It is more plausible that ideological news site use promotes misunderstandings of evidence. 
Factual distortion, like omission, is a risky strategy for a news organization because biased 
coverage can exact a high price if detected (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006). Nevertheless, there is 
considerable evidence that it occurs (Feldman, et al., 2012; Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Sobieraj 
& Berry, 2011). This could be a product of the fierce competition for attention among online 
news sources. Sensational, if misleading, headlines can drive site traffic and promote reader 
engagement (Silverman, 2015). Furthermore, in the face of declining budgets, journalists and 
bloggers may disavow responsibility for the claims they circulate, using hedging words 
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(“purported,” “believed to be,” etc.) and linking to other sources rather than engaging in 
independent verification (Silverman, 2015). Superficial attention to online information only 
exacerbates this problem: One web-tracking company found that one in three users visiting an 
online news article spent less than 15 seconds looking at it (Haile, 2014). It could also be 
because ideological news outlets often distinguish between hard news programming and editorial 
or entertainment content, holding the latter categories to a lower accuracy standard (Patterson, 
2000). This distinction affords news organizations plausible deniability, allowing them to claim 
impartiality in their news coverage while simultaneously endorsing politically expedient 
falsehoods via other content. This could be very effective, as opinion-laden reporting is often as 
persuasive as straight news (Feldman, 2011).  
Whatever the source, consumers exposed to deceptive content are more likely to 
misunderstand pertinent evidence. The debate over climate change provides a vivid example: 
networks differ with regard to how they present scientific agreement on the issue, and this 
influences audience members’ perceptions of the issue (Feldman, et al., 2012). Ideologically 
oriented outlets can also reinforce audience members’ attachment to their political identity 
(Levendusky, 2013), which itself influences perceptions of evidence (Jerit & Barabas, 2012; 
Kahan, et al., 2011). To be clear, misunderstanding evidence is quite different than lacking 
awareness of it: individuals in the former category use inaccurate information to inform their 
decision making, while those in the latter category acknowledge that they lack information. This 
culminates in our hypothesis that use of ideologically oriented websites will promote 
misunderstandings of evidence related to outlet-favored misperceptions (H2).  
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The inverse approach—using more extensive and thorough fact checking to expand 
coverage of misperceptions that hurt an allied party, candidate, or issue—is even more probable. 
Whereas self-interested omissions are likely to generate criticism, neither news consumers nor 
media critics are likely to fault news organizations for providing accurate information, even if 
the corrections serve the outlet’s political interests. Presenting corrective information tends to 
yield modest improvements in belief accuracy (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 
2012). We therefore anticipate that use of ideologically oriented websites will increase 
familiarity with evidence about outlet-opposed misperceptions (H3), and will increase 
understanding of this evidence (H4).  
Misperceptions despite knowing the evidence 
The distinction between what an individual knows of the evidence about a politically charged 
issue and what that individual believes is subtle, but critically important. Knowing what has been 
reported by the media is not the same as believing it; individuals frequently reject claims to 
which they are exposed (Kahan, 2013; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). We aim to demonstrate that 
ideological online news sites play an important role in this process, promoting outlet-favored 
beliefs regardless of the evidence with which the consumer is familiar.  
Ideologically oriented news sites engage in a variety of practices that could contribute to 
their audiences adopting evidence-inconsistent beliefs. First, politically slanted outlets often try 
to cast doubt on the trustworthiness of the opposition and the legitimacy of their conclusions 
(Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). This is consistent with the observation 
that consuming conservative news has been shown to reduce trust in climate scientists, which is 
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in turn associated with doubts about climate change (Hmielowski, Feldman, Myers, Leiserowitz, 
& Maibach, 2014). Second, ideologically oriented outlets could help citizens identify party 
elites’ positions, which has been shown to shape their beliefs. For example, between 2002 and 
2010 Congressional Republicans’ opposition to environmental bills did more to drive down 
public concern about the threat posed by global climate change than media reports describing 
relevant scientific evidence did to drive concern up (Brulle, Carmichael, & Jenkins, 2012). This 
is not simply a product of heightened issue awareness; instead, it is common for individuals to 
alter their stated beliefs to better align with their preferred party’s positions (Lenz, 2009). These 
partisan shifts are not limited to policy preferences and issue stances, but extend to factual beliefs 
as well. Indeed, citizens will often reject assessment by experts in favor of the claims made by 
likeminded partisans (Darmofal, 2005). All of this is consistent with Kahan’s (2013) argument 
that statements of belief serve an important identity-expressive function: Embracing a party-
favored belief conflicting with well established fact may be a form of identity self-defense (408). 
This list of strategies is not exhaustive; rather, we argue that these well documented 
tactics are a sufficient basis on which to offer our prediction that using ideological outlets will 
promote outlet-favored beliefs independent of what consumers know about the evidence. In other 
words, even after accounting for accuracy of knowledge about relevant evidence, use of 
ideologically oriented websites will increase outlet-favored misperceptions (H5a), and reduce 
outlet-opposed misperceptions (H5b).  
Methods 
The data we use to test our predictions come from a three-wave panel study conducted during the 
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2012 U.S. Presidential election by the survey company GfK. The sample includes adult 
Americans drawn from the KnowledgePanel, a probability-based panel with dual-frame 
composition designed to be representative of the U.S. population. (For more information about 
GfK’s sampling procedures, see the Supporting Information). Data for the first wave were 
collected between 13 July and 6 August 2012 and included 1,004 respondents. 783 participants 
completed Wave 2 (77.8% retention rate), which was collected between 31 August 2012 and 3 
October 2012. Wave 3 data were gathered between 2 and 19 November 2012 and included 652 
completed surveys—a 64.9% retention rate between the first and third waves and an 83.4% 
retention rate from Wave 2. The mean age for the sample at Wave 1 was 49.7 (SD = 16.4) and 
47.7% of the sample was male. 74.7% of respondents were White, 8.5% were Black, and 10.6% 
were Hispanic. There is no indication that panel attrition was dependent on demographics: 
primary characteristics of the sample displayed no significant differences across waves. 
Importantly, there were no differences in attrition between Republicans, Democrats, and 
Independents across waves, x2(4) = 1.06, p = .90. In addition, mean levels of liberal or 
conservative online media use did not differ across waves (Fs < .7).  
Measures 
Over the past decade there have been several prominent misperceptions on a range of contentious 
political topics. In this study we choose to focus on four, two reflecting more favorably on 
Republican positions and two with positive implications for Democrats. Selecting this diverse set 
of misperceptions helps to ensure that the effects detected are not bound to a particular topic or 
the wording of a specific item. The well-documented falsehoods that favor Republicans were the 
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claims that President Obama was not born in the United States, and that there were weapons of 
mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq. The Democrat-favored misperceptions parallel these. One 
claim was critical of the 2012 Republican presidential candidate, suggesting that Mitt Romney 
actively managed Bain Capital when the firm started investing in companies that outsourced 
work abroad. The other claim concerned an assertion supporting a widely held Democratic 
policy position, namely that there was an immediate drop in marine life diversity in the Gulf of 
Mexico following the BP oil spill. (More information about the selection of these issues can be 
found in the Supporting Information.) Comparable results across these four issues provide good 
evidence of the robustness of the effects. Differing results, when they occur, are more difficult to 
interpret. We consider the comparability of these items at greater length in the discussion section. 
Familiarity with evidence. Familiarity with evidence about these four disputed claims 
was assessed by asking participants to indicate what the purportedly knowledgeable individuals 
featured in the news media—journalists, members of the U.S.-led fact-finding mission in Iraq, 
fact checkers, and scientists, respectively—had concluded at the time of the study. Questions 
about Obama’s birthplace were asked in all three waves, questions about WMDs were asked in 
the first wave, and questions about Romney and the BP oil spill were included in the third wave.  
These measures were embedded within a larger political-knowledge battery. There were 
four standard political knowledge questions, followed by the four evidence-related items in 
random order. For each claim, respondents indicated what they believed the media had reported 
about the topic by choosing among four response options. Options included both accurate (e.g. 
most journalists believe President Obama was born in the US) and inaccurate responses (e.g. 
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most journalists believe President Obama was not born in the US; journalists are evenly divided 
about where the President was born; and “unsure”). (See Supporting Information for introductory 
text and exact statement wording.) 
To assess whether individuals are unfamiliar with evidence about the claims, we 
constructed four dichotomous variables, one for each issue, coding respondents who indicated 
that they were “unsure” about the evidence high, and collapsing the other three response options 
(e.g. Obama born in the US; Obama not born in US; and journalists evenly divided) into the low 
code (Obama: M = 0.15, SD = 0.36; WMD: M = 0.24, SD = 0.43; Romney: M = 0.43, SD = 0.50; 
BP: M = 0.27, SD = 0.45).  
Accurate knowledge about evidence. The evidence-related items were also used to 
create a series of dichotomous variables to assess whether individuals had an accurate 
understanding of the evidence. Individuals answering the questions correctly were coded high, 
and all others—including those unfamiliar with the evidence—were coded low (Obama: M=0.56, 
SD=0.70; WMD: M=0.48, SD=0.50; Romney: M=0.16, SD=0.37; BP claim: M=0.12, SD=0.33).4 
Belief accuracy. After answering the knowledge questions, respondents were asked what 
they themselves believe about each of the four topics. These items were presented as 5-point 
semantic differentials, with contrasting statements serving as the anchors. (See Supporting 
Information for exact statement wording.) Respondents placed a mark closer to the statement that 
best described their beliefs, locating it in the exact middle if they were unsure of the truth. All 
questions were coded so that higher values were more accurate. Mean scores suggest a range in 
accuracy of personal beliefs across the issues (Obama: M = 3.7, SD = 1.5; WMDs: M = 3.4, SD = 
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1.4; Romney: M = 2.7, SD = 1.2; BP: M = 2.4, SD = 1.2). Placing these items after the 
knowledge battery does make it more likely that respondents would state beliefs consistent with 
the evidence, but this only makes confirming our hypotheses more difficult. 
Liberal and conservative online media use. The survey also measured the extent to 
which respondents used both liberal and conservative online media. Each question described 
below measured partisan online media use on a 5-point scale with response options anchored by 
“Never” and “Every day or almost every day.” Items were coded so that higher values 
correspond to greater use. The measures were intended to capture outlets both large and small at 
both ends of the ideological spectrum. Liberal online media use (Wave 1: M = 1.5, SD = 0.9; 
Wave 3: M = 1.6, SD = 0.9) was assessed by combining responses to two questions that asked 
how often respondents used “the website of a major national news organization that is frequently 
characterized as favoring liberal positions or Democratic candidates, such as The New York 
Times or MSNBC” and “the website of a politically liberal online news organization or blog, such 
as The Huffington Post, ThinkProgress or the Daily Kos.” Conservative online media (Wave 1: 
M = 1.5, SD = 0.8; Wave 3: M = 1.5, SD = 0.9) combined use of “the website of a major national 
news organization that is frequently characterized as favoring conservative positions or 
Republican candidates, such as The Wall Street Journal or FOX News” and “the website of a 
politically conservative online news organization or blog, such as Drudge Report, TownHall or 
the Cybercast News Service (CNS News).” Biased news site usage is generally low: Just over half 
the sample report no use of partisan sites, and another one in five use them only infrequently. 
Detailed usage frequencies are presented in the online Supporting Information (Table S1).5  
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Political party affiliation. Party affiliation was measured on a 7-point scale ranging 
from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican. Dummy variables were created by combining 
respondents who identified as either Republican or Republican-leaning (33.5%), or as Democrat 
or Democrat-leaning (44.8%), with pure Independents serving as the reference category (15.6%). 
Control variables. Several control variables were included in all models, including the 
use of nonpartisan websites, political interest, education, and political knowledge. Wording and 
descriptives for these items are available in the online Supporting Information. 
Results 
Our first hypotheses, H1a and H1b, concern the causal link between ideologically oriented 
website use and political misperceptions. Our multiwave panel provides a stronger test of 
causality then is afforded by cross-sectional design because it allows us to identify the effect of 
changes in news consumption on beliefs, holding the individual fixed. Cross-sectional designs, in 
contrast, compare across individuals, which means that observed relationships may be due to 
unobserved individual differences.  
In our first test of this relationship, we use a cross-lagged regression model to show that 
media use predicts individuals’ inaccurate beliefs, not the other way around. The model is 
autoregressive, premised on the idea that past behavior is the best predictor of present behavior, 
and it attempts to use other variables to explain any remaining variance. Specifically, the model 
tests the relationships between ideologically oriented outlet exposure and accurate beliefs about 
President Obama’s birthplace. That is, does website use predict belief accuracy? Or does 
accuracy predict website use? If media consumption is a causal force, as we hypothesize, then it 
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should have significant predictive power after controlling for beliefs in prior waves. 
Furthermore, this effect should be greater than the alternative relationship, in which changing 
misperceptions lead to greater ideological media exposure. (Note that this approach is premised 
on a strong assumption, which we address after describing the model results). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The results provide modest support for the anticipated influence of ideologically oriented 
news use on misperceptions, though they suggest a more nuanced relationship than initially 
hypothesized. The cross-lagged model coefficients, which were estimated using Mplus, are 
shown in Figure 1. First, we note that the fit of the model is good, easily exceeding the 
thresholds commonly recommended when constructing structural equation models: Ç2 is 
nonsignificant (Ç2 = 9.99, p = .44); the TLI is high (TLI = 1.0); and both RMSEA and SRMR are 
near zero (RMSEA 90% CI [0.00 – 0.04]; SRMR = .01) (Geiser, 2012). As expected, both liberal 
and conservative news use predicts outlet-congruent changes in beliefs over time, albeit 
intermittently. Specifically, conservative outlet use in the second wave predicts a subsequent 
reduction in belief accuracy about Obama’s birthplace, a misperception favored among 
conservatives, in the third wave. Liberal websites have the opposite effect: Liberal outlets use in 
the first wave promotes accuracy on this issue in the second wave. 
Unanticipated by our theorizing, however, is the fact that the direction of the causal arrow 
varies over time, with belief accuracy predicting partisan media use in alternate waves. It would 
be more apt to describe the pattern observed in the cross-lagged model as a feedback loop or 
reinforcing spiral (Slater, 2007). Conservative ideological news use promotes misperception, 
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while liberal news use constrains it, but the resulting (mis)perceptions subsequently promote use 
of outlets expected to favor these beliefs. This bidirectional pattern is consistent with recent work 
demonstrating the reciprocal influence of conservative media and climate change beliefs 
(Feldman, et al., 2014). Theoretically, reversals of the causal arrow could result from selective 
exposure: Individuals are often attracted to sources that affirm their beliefs (Stroud, 2011).  
A significant limitation of this cross-lagged approach, however, is its assumption that 
changes in news consumption are “as-if” randomly assigned. Exposure is rarely random. To 
verify the robustness of these results, we constructed a mixed-effect model, with observations 
nested within respondent, predicting belief accuracy in the current wave by ideologically 
oriented website use in the prior wave, and controlling for demographics (see Table S2 in the 
Supporting Information). Results affirm the cross-lagged regression results: Both liberal and 
conservative website use promotes ideologically consistent beliefs. Nevertheless, H1a and H1b 
are only partially supported. 
No evidence that ideological media reduce awareness of evidence  
Next, we consider the means by which ideologically oriented news outlets might promote 
misperceptions, relying on cross-sectional analyses to test three different mechanisms. We begin 
by assessing whether using these outlets makes audience members less aware of expert 
conclusions about website-favored misperceptions (RQ1). Although this mechanism is intuitively 
appealing, it remains untested and we have identified several reasons to think that it might be 
wrong. We find no evidence in these data that using biased outlets promotes politically beneficial 
naiveté; instead, there is modest evidence that the opposite sometimes occurs. To test the 
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relationship, we estimated a series of logistic regression models predicting whether individuals 
claim ignorance of what experts say about each the four false claims (for a complete list of 
coefficients for all four models, see Table S3 in the Supporting Information). According to these 
models, ideological media had no discernable influence on users’ awareness of expert 
conclusions. This is indicated by nonsignificant coefficients on conservative outlet use for claims 
about Obama’s birthplace and WMDs in Iraq, and on liberal outlet use for claims about the BP 
oil spill and about Romney’s role at Bain Capital when the company outsourced work abroad. 
Instead, the only significant relationship indicates that heavy users of liberal news were more 
likely than lighter users to claim familiarity with, not ignorance of, fact checkers’ conclusions 
about Romney’s role at Bain Capital (OR = 0.70, p < .05).6 This inaccurate claim would have 
benefitted the Democratic Presidential candidate if it had been true, yet a typical citizen who did 
not use liberal sites had a 47% probability of being “unsure” of what fact-checkers had 
concluded, while a comparable heavy user of liberal sites had only an 18% chance. Thus, the 
answer to our first research question (RQ1) is no: We find no evidence that ideological media 
promote ignorance of inopportune evidence. 
We also predicted that ideological news exposure would make users more aware of 
expert conclusions that undermine outlet-opposed false claims (H3; we consider H2 alongside 
H4, in the next section). Although we expected this effect to be small, we were nonetheless 
surprised to see no evidence of the predicted relationship. Reviewing the previously described 
logistic model, we find that all relevant model coefficients are nonsignificant. Conservative 
media was not associated with a significant increase in exposure to the facts surrounding liberal-
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favored misperceptions, or vice versa. We conclude that H3 is unsupported. 
Ideological media promote misunderstanding of some evidence  
Although we cannot infer that ideologically oriented websites make people less aware of factual 
evidence surrounding these issues, they could still undermine accurate knowledge by giving their 
audience false impressions of that evidence. Here we consider whether using biased news 
websites influences the accuracy of users’ knowledge about the conclusions reported in the news 
media (H2 and H4). For example, does use of right-leaning outlets promote errors in assessing 
what knowledgeable individuals featured in the media say about misperceptions favored by 
conservatives and/or reduce errors about misperceptions favored by liberals? The evidence for 
this pair of hypothesis is mixed. We start by looking at some suggestive descriptive statistics 
(computed using sample weights): 15.1% of Republicans wrongly believe that most journalists 
think President Obama was born outside the US, while only 2.8% of Democrats make this error. 
Provocative as this is, it is a poor test of the hypothesis because it does not directly assess the 
influence of news media use—falsely equating party affiliation with news outlet exposure—and 
because it fails to control for several likely confounds. 
A more rigorous test of the hypotheses estimates logistic regression models predicting 
whether individuals hold accurate knowledge about expert conclusions based on their use of 
these news sites (see Supporting Information Table S4 for full models).7 These models 
complement those predicting a lack of knowledge, reported in the previous section. Our goal 
here is to distinguish between factors that reduce awareness of the evidence (the subject of the 
previous analyses) from factors that promote an inaccurate understanding of the evidence. For 
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this reason, we excluded respondents who said they were “unsure” of the evidence from these 
analyses. We find that ideological outlet use does influence the accuracy of users’ knowledge 
about evidence in the expected directions for the two liberal-favorable misperceptions. Liberal 
website use is associated with a reduction in accuracy about what scientists said regarding the BP 
oil spill (OR = 0.61, p < .05) and what fact checkers said about Romney’s role in Bain Capital’s 
outsourcing efforts (OR = 0.55, p < .01). To put these results in context, those who do not use 
liberal news sites had an 18% chance of knowing what scientists said about the BP oil spill, and 
a 35% chance of knowing what fact checkers said about Romney. Heavy liberal website users’ 
performance was considerably worse: They had only a 3% and a 5% chance, respectively, of 
correctly describing the evidence. Conservative website use, in contrast, is associated with 
correct identification of fact checkers’ conclusions about Romney (OR = 1.25, p < .05).8 The 
results for misperceptions favored by liberals are consistent with H2 and H4. There was, 
however, no corresponding effect for misperceptions more prevalent among conservatives: 
Partisan news site use was not associated with significant changes in accuracy when describing 
evidence about the President’s birthplace or the presence of WMDs in Iraq. Overall support for 
the two hypotheses is therefore mixed. We consider these differences, which we believe may 
reflect the issues selected, in the discussion.9 
Rejecting evidence 
Summarizing the results so far, data are consistent with the assertion that ideologically oriented 
websites do shape users’ understanding of evidence surrounding some contested political facts, 
but the effect is modest in magnitude and limited in scope. That leaves one last effect of biased 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
 DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND BELIEFS  22 
outlet exposure that could promote ideologically favorable misperceptions. Recall our prediction 
that ideologically oriented websites would influence users’ beliefs above and beyond their 
knowledge of the evidence (H5a and H5b). Here again descriptive data are compelling: 90.3% of 
Democrats who know what journalists believe about President Obama’s birthplace have reached 
this conclusion themselves, while only 66.7% of Republicans who accurately perceive 
journalists’ positions do the same. A more careful test, however, models beliefs as a product of 
media use after accounting for whether the individual holds accurate knowledge of the evidence. 
We do this using two types of analysis, one compatible with mediation testing within the 
framework of linear structural equation modeling, and the other using the counterfactual 
framework. In the first, we include the mediating factor as a predictor so that we can see how 
much of the outlets’ effect on personal beliefs is not mediated by its effect on an accurate 
understanding the evidence (Hayes, 2013). The second analysis uses the approach described by 
(Imai, Keele, & Tingley, 2010) to decompose the total effect of media use into average direct 
and indirect effects. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The results of the first approach are unambiguous: Use of ideological media is 
consistently associated with holding misperceptions after accounting for the accuracy of 
audience members’ issue-relevant knowledge. That is, use of these news sites is associated with 
holding outlet-favored beliefs even if users know that their beliefs are inconsistent with claims 
made by journalists, fact checkers, scientists, etc. This test takes the form of an ordered logistic 
regression model predicting how accurate an individual’s beliefs are after statistically controlling 
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for accurate knowledge about the conclusions reported in the news media (see Table 1). The 
residual variance after including this factor corresponds to the media’s influence on beliefs 
holding the individual’s familiarity with the evidence constant. Holding constant what users 
know about the topics, we find that conservative outlet use is associated with greater accuracy 
about the BP oil spill and Romney’s role at Bain, and with less accuracy about Obama’s 
birthplace and WMDs in Iraq. In contrast, liberal outlets are linked to more accuracy about 
Obama and Iraq, and less accuracy about the oil spill in the Gulf and about Romney’s 
responsibility for outsourcing U.S. jobs overseas. These results are consistent with H5a and H5b. 
To illustrate the magnitude of these effects we use results of the regression model 
reported above to estimate the predicted probability of holding a party-favored inaccurate belief 
with high confidence despite knowing what the evidence suggests as a product of ideological site 
use (see Supporting Information Table S6). The differences are striking. A Republican who 
knows the facts but does not visit conservative news sites has only a 3% chance of incorrectly 
answering questions about Obama’s birthplace or WMDs. An otherwise identical heavy 
conservative site user, however, has an almost one-in-three (31% and 33%, respectively) chance 
of holding a misperception. Similarly, a Democrat familiar with fact checkers’ conclusions about 
Romney who does not visit liberal sites is almost certain to answer the question correctly (3% 
answer incorrectly); however, about one in ten (10%) Democrats who frequently use liberal sites 
are expected to answer incorrectly, contrary to their knowledge of the evidence. 
A more conservative approach to estimating the influence of website use on beliefs 
unmediated by individuals’ evidentiary knowledge is based on the counterfactual framework, a 
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formal framework for assessing causal inferences (Imai, et al., 2010 and see Acharya, Blackwell, 
& Sen, 2015). This approach uses Monte Carlo simulation to estimate model parameters for both 
outcome and mediator variables, and then computes confidence interval for the average direct 
effect (ADE) and average causal mediation effect (ACME) based on the simulated data (for a 
more detailed description of this approach, see Imai, et al., 2010). To conduct these analyses, we 
rely on a Stata implementation of the algorithm (Hicks & Tingley, 2011). One thousand 
simulations sufficiently produce reliable estimates of these simple models. One notable 
requirement of this approach is that the predictor of interest be expressed as a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether the case corresponds to a “control” or “treatment” condition. For 
these estimates, we consider respondents with little or no use of ideological sites (scores less than 
or equal to two, “rarely” use) to be the control; all others are classified as being in the treatment 
condition.  
Results using the counterfactual approach are generally comparable to those derived from 
the SEM framework, reported above, although two tests in this more conservative approach fall 
short of significance (see Supporting Information Table S7). Conservative media use 
significantly influences beliefs about all four issues after accounting for its influence via accurate 
knowledge. As with the first test, it is associated with lower accuracy about conservative-favored 
misperceptions, and higher accuracy about those favored by liberals. Liberal media use, 
however, is only significantly associated with lower accuracy about liberal-favored 
misperceptions. Taken as a whole, this pattern of results offers strong support for H5a and H5b. 
Discussion 
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Panel data offer additional evidence that biased websites’ contribute to false beliefs, and cross-
section data offer insight into three different types of media effects that could help explain this 
apparent relationship. We consider whether evidence is consistent with the predictions that use of 
biased websites is promoting ignorance of expert conclusions about outlet-favored 
misperceptions, promoting misperceptions of these same expert conclusions, and/or promoting 
misperceptions regardless of users’ knowledge of the evidence. Examining these distinct 
influences allows us to move beyond the simple website exposure-misperception link, helping us 
to better understand theoretically the ways in which ideologically oriented outlets shape beliefs. 
Data are consistent with the prediction that use of politically slanted news sites shapes 
individuals’ perceptions of reality, by (sometimes) altering their understanding of experts’ 
conclusions, and, more importantly, by shaping their beliefs above and beyond what known 
evidence indicates that they should believe. In other words, citizens’ beliefs can deviate from 
what they know about the evidence as reported in the media, and this deviation appears to be 
significantly impacted by their use of ideological websites. Those using conservative (liberal) 
news outlets are more likely to believe falsehoods that favor conservatives (liberals), even if they 
know that experts, such as journalists, fact checkers, or scientists, disagree with them.  
There is little evidence that ideologically oriented websites leave their audiences less 
aware of relevant facts. Rather than contributing to unawareness, use of biased online news 
outlets is associated with seeing evidence in ways that are less threatening to the outlets’ 
interests. Partisan media’s apparent ability to promote misperceptions in spite of exposure to 
more accurate information may help to explain how these misperceptions continue to flourish 
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despite the diversity that characterizes most Americans’ online news diet. 
An important open question concerns why some effects differed across issues. 
Specifically, we found that news media exposure had more influence on misunderstandings of 
evidence for liberal-favored misperceptions than for conservative-favored misperceptions. We 
suspect that this reflects differences in issues selected for this study, and not differences in the 
outlets or audience members. Misperceptions about both WMDs in Iraq and Obama’s birthplace 
received extensive media coverage, including exhaustive fact checking efforts, for years leading 
up to this study. Experts’ conclusions about these issues are unambiguous and stable, so it is 
unsurprising that contemporary media exposure had relatively little influence on citizens’ 
knowledge about these conclusions. Regardless of where you get your news or what you believe, 
you know what experts say about these topics. News about the BP oil spill and about Romney’s 
responsibility for outsourcing U.S. jobs abroad, in contrast, was more recent, the facts were 
relatively unfamiliar to most Americans, and there was considerably more ambiguity. Thus, 
news outlets had a much greater opportunity to shape audiences’ perceptions of what experts 
thought. These explanations are, however, speculative and reflect a limitation of these data. 
Future studies would do well to identify items that exhibit greater comparability. 
Nevertheless, the consistency of results is striking: Across four misperceptions, which 
represented a range of topics (military, environmental, economic, and personal), media profiles, 
and ideological biases, use of ideological oriented websites appeared to have a reliably strong 
influence on audience members’ beliefs, above and beyond what those individuals knew about 
the evidence. Perhaps media’s influence on misunderstandings of the evidence would have been 
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stronger and more consistent with a different set of issues, but even for issues where those effects 
were large (e.g., misperceptions about the BP oil spill) the influence of the media was only 
partially explained by its effect on consumers’ knowledge of the evidence. 
Our reliance on self-reported data is an obvious limitation. It is likely that our media 
exposure measures overestimate actual news consumption (Prior, 2013). The news exposure 
patterns observed in this dataset are consistent with many other types of data, including 
experiments and behavioral data, but validation using other types of data would be worthwhile. 
The reliance on cross-sectional data for most tests is another important limitation. It is possible, 
for example, that people’s evidentiary knowledge drives their media exposure. Even the lagged 
model can be criticized in this regard: Perhaps the approaching election motivated both 
heightened media use and more inaccurate beliefs. Additional research is merited.  
Finally, a valuable complement to this work would be content analyses of ideologically 
oriented news websites. It would be useful to better understand how exactly news organizations 
are able to promote these different types of misperceptions.  
Conclusion 
Political misperceptions pose a challenge to democracy, where citizens are expected to make 
decisions based on accurate (if not complete) information (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). The 
Internet is supposed to help by providing citizens with easier access to relevant information, 
thereby increasing political understanding. This research reminds us that when people seek 
political news, what they learn depends on the news outlets they use. Although Internet users do 
not systematically shield themselves from information that could undermine their existing 
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beliefs, some do include ideologically oriented sources in their information diet. In the month 
leading up to the election, a quarter of Americans said they used biased news sites several times 
or more. Reliance on these websites appear to produce a distorted understanding of evidence, 
potentially promoting inaccurate beliefs even when evidence is understood correctly. It is 
sobering to recognize that online news may contribute to misperceptions even when consumers 
encounter a range of outlets and have been exposed to more accurate political information. 
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1 This approach also allows us to avoid epistemological debates over whether truth is knowable, and to 
discount conspiracy theories founded on the premise that the media, government, and other stakeholders are 
intentionally deceiving the public (see Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013). 
2 Bias has also been estimated based on the language used to describe an issue, as when an outlet selects 
more negative terminology for the opposition (Holtzman, Schott, Jones, Balota, & Yarkoni, 2011). News outlets’ 
political orientation have also been estimated based on editorial content (Stroud, 2011) and on the political 
predispositions of their audiences (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011). 
3 The statistics reported in this section are based on a GfK KnowledgePanel survey of 1,004 adult 
Americans conducted between July 14 and August 7, 2012 and are computed excluding refusals and using weighted 
data to estimate population parameters. A team of researchers that included the authors designed the survey, and its 
results are consistent with those reported elsewhere (National Science Board, 2014). Also note that other variables 
from this dataset are used in subsequent analyses. 
4 We also created an alternative version of this measure, treating accuracy as an ordinal variable coded as 
accurate (3), evenly divided (2), and inaccurate (1). Model results, which are reported in the Supporting Information 
(Table S5), are comparable throughout. 
5 Although the large national news organizations identified in these questions are less biased than those 
with a more explicit political bent, research suggests that even mainstream outlets on the left and right differ both in 
their content (Baum & Groeling, 2008; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006; Groseclose & Milyo, 2005; Holtzman, et al., 
2011) and their audience (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011). The relatively modest bias exhibited by these outlets may 
reduce the effect of any single exposure, making the predicted effects harder to detect, but their broad reach leads us 
to include them in this measure. To ensure that our results were not driven by our inclusion of these widely used 
outlets, we reran all analyses using only the explicitly partisan websites. The direction, magnitude, and significance 
of the coefficients on these alternative models are generally comparable. We note the few exceptions as they arise. 
6 This coefficient is not significant when mainstream outlets are excluded from ideological outlet measures. 
7 As noted above, the model was also tested using an ordered logistic regression and the ordinal measure of 
accuracy. Results for this model specification, which are substantively unchanged, are included in Table S5. 
8 When using only explicitly partisan sites in the model, conservative news use is also associated with more 
accurate beliefs about the BP oil spill (OR = 1.41, p < 0.05). 
9 Although not a central concern of this article, readers may be interested to know that none of the reported 
effects are dependent on users’ party affiliation or ideology. Use of biased outlets influences liberals and 
conservatives in comparable ways. This is not entirely surprising: direct persuasion effects of partisan media have 
been demonstrated elsewhere (Feldman, 2011). 
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Figure 1. Cross-lagged model of ideologically oriented website use and political misperception  
 
 
Notes. Ç2 = 9.99, p = .44; TLI = 1.0; RMSEA 90% CI [0.00 – 0.04]; SRMR = .01. Significant 




Table 1. Ordered logistic regression predicting accuracy of belief by ideological media use, 





Iraqa BP Oil Spillb 
Romney & 
Outsourcingb 
Accurate knowledge of evidence 12.87*** 7.78*** 16.37*** 33.80*** 
Conservative online news use 0.52*** 0.51*** 1.52*** 1.40** 
Liberal online news use 1.56** 1.40** 0.71** 0.61*** 
Nonpartisan online news use 1.27 1.34* 1.00 1.07 
Republican or R. leaning 0.47*** 0.59** 1.32 1.98** 
Democrat or D. leaning 4.07*** 1.90*** 0.87 0.65* 
Political interest 0.88 0.93 1.18 0.87 
Political knowledge 1.03 1.32** 0.94 0.72*** 
Education 1.14** 0.98 0.99 1.01 
N 955 950 614 621 
Log-likelihood -995.79 -1195.47 -709.65 -727.76 
df 9 9 9 9 
Ç2 692.72*** 447.59*** 181.89*** 318.60*** 
Notes. Exponentiated coefficients; Coefficients greater than one denote higher likelihood of 
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holding beliefs consistent with available evidence; a. Measured in wave 1; b. Measured in wave 
3; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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